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Research on Payments for Environmental Services has only recently started to pay attention to 
motivation “crowding”, i.e. the effect that such rewards might have on either strengthening 
(crowding-in) or weakening (crowding-out) participants’ intrinsic motivations to protect and 
sustainably manage natural ecosystems. In this Introduction to the special issue Crowding-out or 
crowding-in? Behavioral and motivational responses to economic incentives for conservation, we 
propose a conceptual framework that maps out how PES implementation, or incentive-based 
conservation more broadly, might lead to motivation and behavioural change, drawing on 
theoretical insights and empirical evidence from behavioural economics and social psychology. We 
also explain how PES design and implementation factors, such as payment type, communication 
and verbal rewards, inclusive and participatory decision-making, and monitoring and sanctioning 
procedures, might harm or enhance intrinsic motivations. We suggest that motivation crowding 
depends on how these policy features are perceived by and affect an individual’s need for 
satisfaction, modulated in turn by the stimulation or inhibition of competence, autonomy, social 
and environmental relatedness. We highlight the importance of measuring these variables and 
their motivation and behavioural outcomes in future PES research, in order to relate psychological 
processes with other contextual determinants of PES social-ecological performance. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Understanding why we act the way we do has been a subject of reflection for centuries by 
philosophers, economists, sociologists, psychologists and, more recently, neuroscientists (Koob et 
al., 2010; Thaler, 2015). Economists have traditionally advocated the maximization of a person’s 
utility function as the guiding principle for understanding human behaviour (Heukelom, 2015). Such 
a principle has been one of the foundations for the use of both cash and in-kind incentives to foster 
biodiversity conservation and the sustainable management of natural resources (Ferraro and Kiss, 
2002). A salient approach in this regard has been the so-called Payments for Environmental or 
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Ecosystem Services (PES). PES consist of persuading “beneficiaries” of certain ecosystem services 
(e.g. watershed regulation, soil conservation, carbon sequestration) to channel money and/or in-
kind rewards (also called, often interchangeably, incentives and payments), to service “providers” 
who should in exchange implement practices that, in theory at least, would result in the increased 
provision of the desired services (Wunder, 2015; Sattler et al., 2013).   
 
It has been commonly assumed that landowners and rural communities will voluntarily participate 
in PES if the incentives received up-front or ex-post are direct and cover the opportunity costs and 
hence result sufficiently attractive to undertake the required activities for the provision of 
ecosystem services (Tacconi, 2012). In other words, ecosystem service “providers” should behave 
as rational actors who calculate the benefits and costs of conservation versus other alternative 
land-use options and act upon accordingly (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). It has also been 
emphasized that PES schemes ought to be efficient, which means they should provide the targeted 
ecosystem service –or ecological proxy- at the minimum cost, and they also should be additional, 
which means that payments must generate a genuine ecological improvement (Engel et al, 2008; 
OECD, 2010). In spite of such theoretical simplicity and appeal, research and practical experiences 
have shown that PES implementation has been a rather “messy” endeavour, in which the socio-
political and cultural complexities of the countries, territories and localities where PES have been 
implemented have taken central stage in its design and implementation (Muradian et al. 2013; 
Engel, 2016; Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016a).  
 
Such complexities have revealed, at least, four shortcomings of the “appealing” PES approach. First, 
the targeting of ES “providers” depends on multi-level governance arrangements where efficiency 
and additionality principles often play a secondary role, submerged by the influence of multiple 
intermediaries, power struggles and by the pursuit of procedural and distributive privileges (Pascual 
et al., 2014; Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016b; Corbera et al., 2007). Second, estimating providers’ 
opportunity costs can be challenging given the methodological difficulties of estimating real 
opportunity costs instead of modelled or stated ones (Brimont et al., 2017), what has made the 
calculation of precise cost-and-benefit baselines a rather difficult enterprise in both developing 
(Wunscher et al., 2008; Borrego and Skutsch, 2014) and industrialized countries (Claassen et al., 
2008). Third, some have highlighted that PES participants might accept to conserve even with 
payments falling below their land-use opportunity costs, driven by a non-economic rationale and a 
set of alternative motivations (Kosoy et al., 2007). And, finally, it has been noted that PES might 
erode the social institutions, cultural values and motivations that sustain a non-utilitarian view of 
biodiversity conservation and natural resource management in some contexts (McCauley, 2006; 
Arsel and Buscher, 2012; Peluso, 2012; McAfee, 2012; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010).  
 
Generally speaking, motivations to participate in a given activity, such as a PES, can be broadly 
classified in intrinsic and extrinsic. The former implies doing something because it is inherently 
interesting or enjoyable, regardless of anything else. Extrinsic motivations, in turn, involve a 
diversity of reasons external to oneself, including punishments, such as fines, or incentives, such as 
cash or in-kind rewards (Ryan and Deci, 2000b). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations are not mutually 
exclusive, which means that a combination of both might explain in some instances why one acts in 
a specific way. In the PES literature, as noted above, some have hinted at the possibility that PES 
weaken people’s intrinsic motivations to conserve –i.e. crowd out- over time, leading individuals to 
participate in conservation exclusively driven by extrinsic reasons (Rico Garcia-Amado et al., 2013; 
Rode et al., 2015), while others have suggested that payments might reinforce intrinsic motivations 
–i.e. crowd in-, potentially making participants intrinsically more conservation pro-active 
(Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2016). Whichever the nature of motivation crowding, the alleged direct 
causality between changes in motivations and behaviours might not always hold, since some 
studies have suggested that motivations and behaviours are not always aligned (Steg and Zlek, 




Investigating the effect of PES design and implementation on individual motivations and 
conservation behaviour is the focus of this special issue. This introductory article has three 
objectives: (i) to review the main theoretical underpinnings and research findings from behavioural 
economics and social psychology, disciplines which have extensively focused on the study of the 
interactions between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to explain human behaviour (section 2); (ii) 
to develop a conceptual framework that reflects on the relationship between PES implementation 
and motivation crowding, paying attention to the different contextual scales in which PES operate 
(section 3); and (iii) to discuss the findings of the special issue articles in the light of the proposed 
framework (section 4). The article concludes identifying some knowledge gaps and methods that 
could guide PES research in the future (section 5).   
  
2. Motivation crowding through the lens of behavioural economics and social psychology 
 
Titmuss (1971) was the first to address motivation crowding out in the context of blood donation 
campaigns: his findings suggested that people were less keen to donate blood if provided with an 
economic incentive. Since then, a large number of economic experiments in the education, industry 
and health sectors have demonstrated the effect of economic incentives on motivations to perform 
a given task (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gibbons, 1998; Frey and Jegen, 2011; Gneezy et al., 
2011). Economists have found intrinsic motivations to crowd out when incentives are introduced 
for activities that used to happen without such incentives, such as for collective activities (Ostrom, 
2000; Houser et al., 2008; Bracht and Feltovich, 2008) and reciprocal behaviour (Fehr and Gachter, 
1997; 2002). Similarly, payments that substitute for social norms can also crowd out intrinsic 
motivations (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). Sanctions and monitoring –a key feature of PES- crowd 
out intrinsic motivations if they are perceived as a signal of distrust or as a limitation of one self’s 
freedom, in particular when work settings involve interpersonal relationships (Dickinson and 
Villeval, 2008; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Falk and Koskfeld, 2006). The only exception being 
that, when control limits free riding, such control can increase the feeling of fairness of the reward 
and subsequently offset crowding-out effects (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). 
 
Whereas behavioural economics have demonstrated that external incentives induce mainly 
motivation crowding-out, the opposite outcome happens in other but less frequent cases (Le 
Grand, 2006; Meyer and Gagné, 2008). For example, in a review from laboratory and field 
experiments, Frey and Jegen (2001) find that external incentives crowd in motivations when their 
implementation draws on pre-existing trust among actors. In other cases, the evidence of the 
relationship between external incentives and motivations is less straight forward, what attests of 
their complex interactions. For example, while some studies point out that rewarding economically 
the pro-social values of volunteering activities increases volunteers’ intrinsic motivations and 
performance (Thomas et al., 2009; Fiorillo, 2011), others show a net decrease without a precise 
identification of the underlying mechanism that might explain such different outcomes (Frey and 
Götte, 1999). In the context of blood donation, Le Grand (2006) found that payments and 
motivations follow an S-shaped curve: while a little payment increases blood donation levels, at 
some point the payment impacts intrinsic motivations negatively and decreases such levels. Very 
high payments become then necessary to boost blood supply again. 
 
When dealing specifically with pro-environmental behaviour, economic theories and experiments 
have recently mounted in the areas of industrial, water and waste management, recycling, and 
mobility and consumption decisions (Frey, 1992; 1993; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Brekke et 
al., 2003; Bowles, 2008). In the field of ecosystem services, Rode et al. (2015) review eighteen 
empirical studies published after 2013 dealing with the impacts of tradable quotas, environmental 
taxes, subsidies and payments for biodiversity conservation on resource managers’ motivations. 
They identify seven psychological mechanisms that induce motivation crowding-out and four 
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leading to crowding-in. Among the studies reviewed, eight relate to PES schemes. Like prior 
reviews, the authors suggest that crowding-out is more frequent than crowding-in but that the 
understanding of the causal mechanisms behind the shift in motivations remains poor. One of the 
possible explanations for such poor understanding is the lack of a shared analytical framework that 
would allow comparing metrics, research protocols and results to unravel the nature of such 
mechanisms. In sum, behavioural economics studies have focused on understanding how 
motivation crowding-out affects performance and the supply of services under different contextual 
situations, but without discerning in detail the underlying psychological mechanisms behind 
motivational change and without making a clear distinction between motivations and behaviours.  
 
Social psychology has approached motivation crowding as an understanding of what governs our 
actions, giving a specific place to the role of motivations in order to reach a theoretical formulation 
of the causal mechanisms governing motivation crowding-out. The fist theory to make explicit the 
link between external incentives and motivations was Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET), which in 
turn draws from the combination of two former theories, i.e. the locus of control (Rotter, 1954; 
1966) and the theory of the perceived locus of causality (deCharms, 1968). While the former 
discusses if a person understands the control of her/his life as being dependent on oneself or 
placed outside her/his control, the second discusses the extent to which individuals perceive their 
actions as caused by internal or external reasons. Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) results from 
the combination of these two theories and was the first referring to motivation crowding. CET 
states that a person will feel more intrinsically motivated if she/he perceives the locus of causality 
of performing an action as being internal. This means that an individual intrinsically motivated 
performs an action for the pleasure of doing it –i.e. because of experiencing her/his competence on 
the task – and because of being free to decide –i.e. autonomous. These two psychological 
dimensions are central concepts in the special issue: while competence in CET means an increase or 
recognition of our ability to do something, autonomy refers to our perception of how much we 
think we master our decisions. Hence, the main theoretical prediction of CET was that any 
externally driven economic incentive designed to achieve an outcome would decrease intrinsic 
motivations if it eroded autonomy (Deci, 1975).  
 
CET was further developed in the so-called Self-Determination Theory (SDT), which analyses more 
in detail the role that these psychological dimensions –e.g. feeling of autonomy and competence-, 
might play in determining the loss of intrinsic motivations. These psychological dimensions, 
referred to as moderators in SDT, encompass the above-mentioned sense of autonomy and feeling 
of competence, as well as the self-evaluation of our interactions with others –i.e. social relatedness 
(Deci and Ryan, 1991; Ryan and Deci, 2000a). Social relatedness in SDT refers to our feeling of social 
belongingness, that is how we perceive our connection to, and experience caring for others 
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995). As such, it represents a bold psychological dimension for PES 
implementation and another central concept addressed by our special issue. Furthermore, SDT 
posits that an individual’s distinctive activation of these moderators can explain the enhancement 
or decrease of her/his psychological satisfaction when performing a given task. Because SDT 
describes such psychological satisfaction as a people’s basic need, it is normally referred to as 
psychological need satisfaction or need satisfaction (Deci and Vansteenkiste, 2004). From this 
perspective, any change on such need satisfaction moderators caused by, for example, a given 
external reward or punishment, could trigger a psychological response (e.g. frustration, release 
from moral responsibility, increased confidence) that may ultimately explain a gain or loss in 
intrinsic motivations. An additional important feature of SDT is the self-determination continuum. 
This continuum presupposes the existence of a motivational axis that encompasses one’s complete 
demotivation to perform a given task in one extreme and one’s unique intrinsic motivation in 
another. Such a conceptualization allows representing motivation crowding-out as the relative 
“move” induced by the norm, incentive or policy towards the demotivation extreme; in contrast, 
motivation crowding-in implies “moving” in the opposite direction (Gagné and Forest, 2008). The 
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existence of the self-determination continuum also presupposes that external regulations or 
incentives can be internalized: if they align with the three psychological moderators, external 
regulations can be progressively assimilated as something we perform for its intrinsic importance.  
 
Although alternative works in social psychology propose other theories to explain pro-
environmental behaviour  –such as the over-justification hypothesis1 (see e.g. Lepper et al., 1973), 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) and the Value-Belief-Norm Theory (Stern et al., 
1999)-, SDT has been acknowledged by many contemporary social psychologists as the most 
accurate explanatory framework to explain motivation crowding (Festré and Garrouste, 2014). 
Some have tested SDT postulates through laboratory experiments2 –mostly with undergraduate 
psychology students-, and others through natural field experiments (Festré and Garrouste, 2014). In 
their meta-analysis of 128 studies exploring the motivation crowding effect of verbal versus 
economic incentives, Deci et al. (1999) found that economic incentives decreased intrinsic 
motivations, although the effect varied depending on the type of population and level of economic 
reward. For example, verbal incentives increased intrinsic motivations but only for college students 
when compared to children. On average, monetary rewards decreased intrinsic motivations, but 
performance-based payments were less detrimental. Deci and colleagues also discuss that, 
although incentives are normally felt as an imposition and thus translate into a decrease in intrinsic 
motivations, they can also be perceived as fair and legitimate, which leads to the strengthening of 
intrinsic motivations. Such a two-sided effect depends on the incentive characteristics, the type of 
task to be accomplished (e.g. boring vs. stimulating), the individual’s social characteristics (e.g. level 
of education, gender, age), and the interpersonal context, including institutions and cultural values. 
In contrast with behavioural economics, social psychology has advanced an explicit theoretical 
model to explain motivation crowding-out, focusing on the underlying mechanisms behind changes 
in motivations. 
 
3. A conceptual framework to understand motivation crowding in PES 
 
We now turn to present a conceptual framework that can help us analyse motivation crowding in 
PES. The framework enlarges SDT in three aspects. First, it includes an additional psychological 
moderator that we call ‘environmental relatedness’ (table 1), which accounts for the human feeling 
of belonging to a natural setting or landscape (d’Adda, 2011; Greiner and Gregg, 2011; Fisher, 
2012). Second, our framework integrates the influence of policy design and the impact of 
motivations on performance, research dimensions frequently present in the behavioural economics 
literature. And third, we include the influence of the larger individual –education and culture- and 
social –social norms, institutions and markets- context.  By proposing a specific conceptual 
framework for understanding motivation crowding in PES we aim to describe how PES design 
features, such as monitoring and sanctioning, type and amount of economic incentives, interaction 
with local and larger institutions, and participatory and collective management mechanisms, might 
cognitively affect participants’ moderators (Sattler et al., 2013; Dedeuwardeare et al., 2016).  
 
FIGURE 1 COMES HERE 
Figure 1. Motivation crowding pathways in PES. The asterisk (*) indicates the undermining effect. 
 
TABLE 1 COMES HERE  
 
                                                          
1 According to self-perception theory, a person infers causes about his or her own behavior based on external constraints 
such as an external incentive or reward. When given, it leads a person to conclude that he or she is performing the 
activity solely for the reward, which shifts the person's motivation from intrinsic to extrinsic. 
2 Laboratory experiments usually measure intrinsic motivation as the time spent in the experiment task during a break 
between two periods of time in which the experiment task is obligatorily performed. 
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Figure 1 represents our conceptual framework. It highlights the relationships between PES design 
and implementation features (left-hand side shaded box), and the institutional context in which PES 
operate (central, dotted areas), with motivation crowding-in or crowding-out processes (central 
area). These processes are influenced by need satisfaction moderators (left-hand side boxes) and 
they result in distinct degrees of PES long-term performance (right-hand side boxes).  
 
The figure is grounded on the premise that PES design and implementation, including PES 
application and participation criteria, payment levels, or monitoring and enforcement activities, 
combined with both personal and contextual conditions, such as education, wellbeing, collective 
action and broader institutions, will activate participant’s need satisfaction moderators (Table 1). 
This first step is expressed in the extreme left of the causal mechanism arrow as Activators (PES 
implementation). PES implementation cognitively interacts with these moderators in the 
participant’s central valuation brain system (Murayama et al., 2010). Such interaction forms the 
second step in the causal mechanism of the conceptual framework and is described as Interaction 
between moderators. This interaction can be seen as a psychological mechanism, that is, a mental 
and emotional pattern that originates in a given situation. The outcome -which we describe as the 
Psychological evaluation outcome- will be either an increase or a decrease in the participant’s need 
satisfaction level. According to the SDT continuum, if intrinsic motivations increase then extrinsic 
motivations automatically decrease. The opposite holds too and is described in the causal arrow of 
the framework as a Motivational change.  
 
The fifth step in the causal sequence relates with behaviour during PES implementation (i.e. 
Behavior short-term in the framework). Existing evidence on the link between external incentives, 
intrinsic motivations and behaviour shows that during PES implementation, conservation usually 
improves: Indeed, during PES implementation, conservation behaviour increases either because 
participants are stimulated only by extrinsic motives, or by only intrinsic motives or by a 
combination of both (Andersson et al., 2018; Borner et al., 2016). How these different 
configurations affect conservation performance during PES implementation is difficult to be 
explained and existing evidence does not allow us to be conclusive.  However, the sixth and last 
step in our causal sequence (Behavior long-term in the framework) posits that, after the end of the 
programme, we can expect conservation behaviour to get back either to pre-PES levels or even to a 
lower level (Andersson et al., 2018; Borner et al., 2017). This potential negative time-lagged of 
motivation crowding-out or undermining effect can potentially be one of the major drawbacks of 
PES implementation. Undermining effect happens therefore when motivation crowding-out 
provokes post-PES conservation performance to fall below conservation levels before PES. This 
potential impact of PES on both motivations and behaviour in the longer term expresses a move of 
the individual’s overall bundle of motivations along one of the sides of the self-determination 
continuum, represented in our framework at the bottom right. A net increase in intrinsic 
motivations moves the individual’s bundle of motivations towards the extreme of the axis 
dominated by only extrinsic motivations –represented with a minus in the axis.  A decrease in 
intrinsic motivations moves the individual’s motivations towards the other extreme of the axis, 
dominated by only extrinsic motivations –represented with a plus in the axis.  
 
Finally, as previously mentioned, the conceptual framework posits that the effect that PES 
implementation might have on need-satisfaction moderators will respond to each individual 
background, including the educational and cultural context and the larger inter-personal and 
institutional setting. As such, the framework contains two embedded scales: the individual scale 
and a broader, contextual scale that includes institutions (e.g. social norms, markets) and cultural 
values that interact with each other and co-evolve.   
 




4.1. Methods and metrics 
 
The seven articles included in this special issue present the results of research performed in South-
East Asia (India and Cambodia), Central-Asia (Kyrgyz Republic), East Africa (Tanzania) and Latin 
America (Nicaragua and Colombia). All articles deal with PES, except for one article that studies an 
organic certification premium-price scheme, and they focus on the effects of a real or hypothetical 
PES intervention on motivation crowding. In doing so, four articles use framed-field experiments, 
one article deploys quasi-experimental methods that quantitatively evaluate the impact of “real” 
ongoing PES schemes and two articles use ethnographic methods (Table 2). The first set of four 
articles use role games and framed field experiments to study the interaction between payment 
design, motivations and behaviours. Each article adopts a different proxy for conservation 
behaviour, which the authors assume to reflect motivations. Proxys for conservation behaviour 
include tree-harvesting rates (Handberg et al.) and land forest conservation decisions (Kaczan et al., 
Moros et al. this issue).   
 
Kaczan et al. (this issue) implement a modified dictator game where forest conservation decisions 
run under four different policy treatments (individual PES, collective PES and two mandatory 
conservation levels) to test for the undermining effect. Handberg et al. (this issue) use a common 
pool forest game in Tanzania to test for the impact of different payment levels on motivation 
crowding-out. The authors also test for the role of competence, social and environmental 
relatedness to predict changes in intrinsic motivations. Moros et al. (this issue) develop a public 
good game with threshold and confront the game outcomes with a post-experiment survey on 
motivations to test for the role of autonomy, competence and collective action in reinforcing 
intrinsic motivations. Moreover, the authors conduct a specific post-experiment survey to 
investigate if a change in motivations correlates with a change in the conservation behaviour 
observed in the experiment. Kolinjivadi et al. use a framed field experiment to analyse qualitatively 
how skill recognition and community inclusiveness motivates young villagers to enrol in the 
experiment.  
 
In the only article using quasi-experimental methods, Chervier et al. (this issue) implement a 
control-treatment approach with matching to quantify the impact of payments for biodiversity 
conservation in Cambodia on declared pro-environmental perceptions and on the probability of 
breaking conservation rules after the end of the contract –another proxy to detect an undermining 
effect. Finally, the last two articles use an ethnographic protocol to analyse the role of the context 
in terms of norms and institutions when it comes to understand what other enabling factors are 
needed for PES to change motivations. Bose et al. (this issue) analyse the variety of motivations 
behind the will of farmers to engage in the price-premium certification scheme proposed by the 
Rainforest Alliance. Van Hecken et al. disentangle how motivations co-evolve with productive 
systems in a wider agrarian territorial context.  
 
These distinctive articles provide insights on what methods fit best for each specific research 
question and data availability. Framed field experiments and quasi-experimental methods allow 
formulating need satisfaction moderators and crowding mechanisms in quantitative terms. Besides, 
the variety of ways to formulate a game allows controlling for the different specifications of PES 
design. However, given the highly controlled environment in which they are played, framed field 
experiments are criticized for having a limited external validity. Only Handberg et al. test for 
external validity, with positive results for the specific context where the experiment is performed. 
Qualitative studies allow to better integrate the influence that the context might have –e.g. in 
terms of governance dynamics and institutions- in enabling a change in intrinsic motivation given a 
particular PES design. Nevertheless, these studies do not offer a quantitative measure of the impact 
on motivations and conservation. Quasi-experimental methods seem to meet the weakness the 
other methods have: they have a strong external validity, need a solid qualitative understanding of 
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the context and offer a quantitative measure of impact. However, they are expensive to carry, the 
experimental design needs a strong political support from the implementing organization and the 
robustness of their estimations depends on the reliability of the control units.  
 
This methodological diversity also points out to the relevant challenge of which “metrics” to use 
when aiming to understand motivation crowding. Authors in the special issue and in the literature 
reviewed above tend to omit the discussion on the alleged direct causality between motivation 
crowding and a change in behaviours. For practical and data availability reasons, both Handberg et 
al. and Kaczan et al. mechanically associate participants’ behaviour in their experiments -a highest 
tree-harvesting rate or a larger conversion of forest to agricultural land respectively- with a change 
in participants’ motivations. Likewise, Chervier et al. use stated perceptions and suggested future 
behaviours as a proxy for motivations. Such challenge will need to be tackled in future research if 
one really aims at better understanding PES theory of change. Only Moros et al. test the 
correlations between the behaviours recorded in the experiment and stated conservation 
motivations emerging from a post-experiment survey. A similar challenge emerges when defining 
proxies for need-satisfaction moderators. For example, Handberg et al. use the presence of a 
relative in the experimental room as a proxy for social relatedness while Moros et al. use personal 
statements from the motivation survey, like “I would be criticized by my neighbours if I clear the 
forest”, as a proxy for social relatedness.  
 
TABLE 2 COMES HERE 
4.2. Motivation crowding 
Compiling and comparing research result when different research methods and hypotheses are 
mobilised across the articles included in this special issue proves a difficult task. To do so, in table 2 
we aimed at systematizing and conceptualizing such results by representing motivation crowding-
out our motivation crowding-in as a function of the moderators and sub-moderators proposed in 
our framework, in order to compare the empirical results in a qualitative manner. Main findings are 
summarised thereafter. 
 
Kaczan et al. find on average no evidence for an undermining effect under the four treatments but 
a strong and persistent motivation crowding-in for the mandatory treatment. The authors explain 
this result as a possible framing effect in which the participants of the mandatory treatment 
perceive the top-down prescriptive behaviour as a socially appropriate one –i.e. it is internalized as 
a new social norm. Nevertheless, when comparing the effects of the different treatments with the 
socio-economic characteristics of participants they find both crowding-in and crowding-out to 
coexist. Although motivation crowding-in is more significant that crowding-out, the former is 
particularly relevant given the large number of foreign landowners involved in PES.  
 
Øyvind and Angelsen’s also do not find on average a statistically significant support for motivation 
crowding-out under PES. Their results show that when no or low payments are offered, the real 
level of conservation is higher than predicted, revealing the existence of intrinsic and other 
intangibles in explaining conservation behaviour at low opportunity costs (Kosoy et al., 2007). 
Besides, their results underscore that increasing payments has a negative, but diminishing effect on 
harvest rates, but find no support of SDT moderators in explaining it: participants have a non-
compressive minimum forest harvest need –e.g. for subsistence or fuelwood- that is not 
interchangeable with a payment. However, as a source of caution, the perceptions and statements 
of the authors’ post-experimental survey suggest that payments could make traditions, culture and 




Moros et al. find that while forest conservation increases under all payment types, the crop-price 
premium scheme fosters motivation crowding-out while collective payments induce motivation 
crowding-in. They suggest, however, that –during the experiment- an increase in intrinsic 
motivations does not directly imply an increase in conservation behaviour or vice-versa. In the real-
life experimental setting of the Kyrgyz republic case study, Kolinjivadi et al. confirms the link 
between motivation crowding-in and collective PES if the latter aligns with social norms and the 
social capital is strong. They define such alignment as a synergistic positive shift that strengthens 
intrinsic motivations. Nevertheless, antagonistic shifts can also occur if collective benefits or 
payments are implemented in a context of mistrust. Individual motivations and collective norms are 
in continued interaction, and a challenge in PES design is to follow and adapt to such feedbacks.  
 
In the Cardamom Mountains of Cambodia, Chervier et al. find that the implementation of a real PES 
programme brings a new social-environmental paradigm in terms of semantics and social norms, in 
sharp contrast with their cultural values. As a result, PES shifts participants’ perceptions of forest 
values from use values to monetary values. Moreover, at the individual level, if PES is perceived as 
colluding with pre-existing power inequities and the unfair distribution of conservation costs and 
benefits, motivation crowding-out is stronger and persisting after the end of the scheme. Chervier 
et al. results suggest that statements on future actions express a reliable intention of breaking 
forest conservation norms in individuals that before entering the PES scheme were respecting it –
i.e. an expression of the undermining effect.  
 
Using an ethnographic approach, Bose et al. shows more nuanced results when dealing with 
motivations to join the Rainforest Alliance coffee certification. Authors show that participation can 
only be appropriately understood if taking into account a hybrid framework where both intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivations are at work. Their results show that while non-economic reasons to 
participate link to intrinsic motivations, economic reasons can mobilize both intrinsic –upgraded 
farm management, more knowledge- and extrinsic –pure financial gain- motivations. Besides, the 
authors point out at two important aspects: the importance of certification as a way to reach more 
autonomy by gaining negotiation powers at state level; and the importance between the long-term 
vs short-term framing of policy interventions, with short-term interventions being more prone to 
crowd out intrinsic motivations and enrolment. Finally, van Hecken et al. deepens on how 
productive and conservation motivations are embedded in a larger rural territorial context by 
applying an agrarian system approach. Such approach allows underscoring that the implementation 
of the PES scheme actually failed to alter the motivations of farmers, mostly because the design 
neglected larger contextual regional and historic development pathways of resource and forest use 
where the improvement of cattle activities is at the core of collective and individual motivations.  
 
4.3. Accounting for motivational mechanisms in PES design 
 
Based on the contributions to this special issue and PES literature, Table 3 summarizes how need 
satisfaction moderators might be related to PES design features (as in figure 1). First, we observe 
that one of the recurrent mechanisms tested in our special issue is if collective PES rewards are 
more likely to foster motivation crowding-in than individual rewards. It appears that in a context 
where social capital is strong –i.e. reciprocity norms exist, people trust each other, and leaders are 
respected, collective PES can increase intrinsic motivations (Andersson et al., 2018; Bottazzi et al., 
2018). However, the opposite holds also true if social conflicts are widespread and leaders are not 
respected (Costedoat et al, 2016). These results can be justified on the grounds of an interaction 
between social relatedness moderators and the institutional context in which PES is developed. If 
social capital is strong, a PES programme that considers social relatedness moderators might be 
able to foster motivation crowding-in, by engaging in collective work and investments –for 
example- when participants trust each other, local institutions and leaders (Table 3). In contrast, if 
social conflicts challenge the reliability of local institutions, investments and activities benefiting the 
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group might not be well perceived. In this case, relying on individual motivations such as autonomy 
and competence offers more chances of activating intrinsic motivations (Gert et al. this issue). In a 
nutshell, an analysis of social capital prior to PES design, we believe, can help promoters align 
moderators with the type of payments, either collective or individual . 
 
Table 3 also makes evident that although the environmental relatedness moderator has not been a 
central matter of concern in the articles of the special issue, when tested, it has provided 
interesting insights. For example, in the latent class model of Kaczan et al. (this issue), foreign 
landowners are more prone to depend on extrinsic motivations to behave pro-environmentally. 
Similarly, Bose et al. (this issue) find that the will to have the name “Kogadu” in the certified coffee 
was an important motivation to participate.  
 
In line with the moderator on environmental relatedness, the importance of autonomy has not 
been systematically analysed by the special issue contributions. In fact, when explicitly tested it did 
not have a strong effect:  Moros et al. (this issue) introduce a treatment that includes a voting 
option, but it did not affect motivational outcomes. Bose et al. (this issue) posit that coffee 
producers see the certification process as a way of gaining more autonomy with respect to the 
central government. The role played by autonomy, in particular by designing the PES in a 
participatory way, has also not been widely tested by the research papers of the special issue. 
Emerging PES literature on motivations shows that an inclusive participation favours intrinsic 
motivations (Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2016). Chervier et al. (this issue) find that the top-down 
conservation approach led by an international NGO fosters a monetary perception of forest 
conservation. Moros et al. (this issue) find no effect on motivations when introducing in the framed 
field experiment the option to vote the type of payment design. One possible complexity for 
understanding the effect of autonomy on motivations to conserve is the fact that how an individual 
perceives the ability of being autonomous depends not only on the possibility of making individual 
choices but also on how meaningful these individual choices are at the collective and institutional 
levels (interpersonal context in figure 1). 
 
Competence appears as an important moderator in a number of articles from the special issue. 
Bose et al. (this issue) and van Hecken et al. (this issue) identify excellence in land management 
skills as key individual motivators among coffee growers and cattle ranchers. PES can be perceived 
as a recognition of existing competences or as a way to improve participants’ skills: in both cases 
the feeling of being competent at the individual level seems to strengthen intrinsic motivations. 
Such a recognition of effort and capacities can also be supported by the recognition of a wider 
social group, when such group is respected (Kolinjivadi et al. this issue). 
 
TABLES 3 COMES HERE 
 
Overall, the articles gathered by the special issue show that motivations to conserve depend on the 
emotional multi-dimensionality of an individual, situated in a particular socio-institutional and 
environmental context. This implies that psychological mechanisms leading to motivation crowding-
out and motivation crowding-in can co-exist within a group of participants (Kaczan et al. and Moros 
et al. this issue) but also for a same individual (Bose et al., this issue). Hence, the observed 
conservation behaviour emerges from the aggregation of different motivations, making behavioral 
patterns rather unstable and unpredictable, so far.  
 
5. The future of PES and motivation crowding research 
 
In this article, we have drawn on SDT and insights from behavioural economics to develop a 
conceptual framework for the study of PES and motivation crowding. We believe that such 
framework can improve our understanding of the relationship between conservation incentives 
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and human behaviour and motivations, as well as it can aid the (re-)design of PES programmes. 
Based on the framework and the insights of the special issue, we have argued that, during PES 
implementation, conservation behaviour frequently improves, either driven by extrinsic or intrinsic 
motivations. However, once payments are removed, it is likely that extrinsically motivated 
individuals adopt a lower conservation behaviour compared to the pre-PES period. The latter is the 
so-called undermining effect of PES, which can put at risk the long-term additionality of PES 
initiatives (Börner et al., 2017). We have also argued that such motivations are by no means static; 
PES design and implementation features, including an inclusive design through participation 
measures, an alignment with local institutions, or the support of individuals’ personal development 
can recraft both intrinsic or extrinsic motivations. But these motivations can also change as a result 
of changes in the personal and interpersonal context. 
 
We are aware that our propositions above need to be further validated by future research. In 
particular, more research on the role that autonomy and competence can play in conservation 
performance and the long-term sustainability of PES and other incentive-based conservation 
programmes should contribute to overcome a bias towards the analysis of pro-social and 
environmental relatedness as key moderators of behavioural and motivational change. 
 
The special issue contributions also reflect the variety of qualitative and quantitative 
methodological approaches that, either combined or alone, can help advance this research agenda. 
On the one side, qualitative methods can bring to the fore how participants’ discourse changes 
before and after PES implementation, and in doing so it can make explicit which moderators play a 
role in participants’ behaviour and motivational change, and how these moderators relate to PES 
design and implementation features. On the other, experimental designs in hypothetical 
implementation scenarios can also aid PES design by identifying which moderators lead to 
increased conservation outcomes, including once payments are removed. It is our view, however, 
that combining research methods should improve the external validity of framed field experiments, 
which are still widely criticized of being unable to capture real life decision settings (Baylis et al., 
2016). Probably, to avoid the bias of fictitious experimental settings, experiments need to be within 
real environmental programmes (Byerly et al., 2018).  
 
Future research should also consider the interaction between moderators and the role of the larger 
context. Because a PES participant is exposed simultaneously to different implementation 
mechanisms, both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations coexist, with, ultimately, a net change towards 
an increase in extrinsic or intrinsic motivations. How this interaction and evaluation outcome 
happens needs to be better described. Seemingly, if the role of the context is not well analysed, the 
same PES design can unchain different and unexpected changes in motivations (Alix-Garcia et al., 
2018). In addition to understanding local levels of trust and social capital in order to be able to 
design better PES programme or to highlight how such programme might result or not in 
motivational crowding, becoming aware of changing markets for local goods and services or 
evolving philosophical and existential values among PES participants and beyond is also critical 
(Singh, 2015). For practitioners, this means to invest more in socio-economic and feasibility studies 
before they rush into PES design and implementation. While NGOs may be constrained by donors’ 
limited funds and willingness to see results delivered in a short time (3 to 4 years), investing more 
effort and time ex ante will increase efficiency (increased impacts and decreased costs) ex post.     
 
Finally, because of the co-existence of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations during PES 
implementation, their impact on conservation behaviour is difficult to isolate when payments are 
ongoing. Our conceptual framework posits that the impact of a change in motivations will be better 
revealed in the long term, after payments stop. This long term effect of motivations on actual 
conservation behaviour has been largely overlooked by PES research and, in a context where 
financial constraints might dramatically limit PES funding and therefore the number of PES 
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beneficiaries, better understanding if and how the undermining effect happens can be crucial to 
increase the efficiency of environmental incentives. This is a critical research issue. For framed field 
experiments it means running a post-treatment game on both control and treated populations 
(Andersson et al., 2018), and in quasi-experimental and other real-life evaluations, this means to 
develop panel data approaches to analyse the behaviour and motivations of those who stopped 
participating in the programme or were left-out. This will allow investigating the potentially 
significant lagged effect of motivations on conservation behaviour. 
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Moderator Sub-moderator Description 





Recognition of skills relates to taking into consideration the human 
capacities that a participant has to support the design and 
implementation of the PES programme. 
 
Personal development refers to the alignment of PES actions with the 
wills of participants’ personal development. 
Autonomy Inclusive design   
 
 
Capacity to decide whether or not be part of the design of the PES 
programme. 













Group or community 
inclusion  
Social norm implying having a positive action towards somebody or 
something as a response to another positive action towards oneself. 
Such social norm applies also for hostile or negative behaviours. 
 
Process for reaching an equitable allocation of goods (e.g. payments, 
technical assistance). 
 
Social justice and fairness refers to the existence of fair and just 
relations between the individual and society –i.e. from the local to the 
national and international scales. It refers to how PES implementation 
affects, for example, the distribution of wealth, options for personal 
development, and social privileges. 
 
Feeling of being included and part of a group or community. 
Environmental 
relatedness 




Well-being, awareness of 
healthy environment 
Feeling of belonging refers to the understanding of one’s identity and 
cultural values as defined and linked by a landscape and ecosystem 
where PES is implemented. 
 
Awareness of the positive effect that the environment or ecosystem 
protected by PES has on your health (e.g. clean water, clean air, forest 
hiking and running). 
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Methods & metrics 
 
Operationalization of the 
framework 















MCOUE = ƒ (Pay-T, Pen) 
 
MCOUE:  Undermining effect 
measured as conservation 
behaviour in the experiment. 
Pay-T: Collective PES, individual 
PES or mandatory conservation. 
Pen: Penalty in the mandatory 
conservation. 
Average treatment effect: 
No evidence under PES 
treatment. 




Individual PES: suggestive 
MCO for big landowners not 
born in the village. 
Mandatory: MCO and MCI co-
exist but MCI much stronger 













experimental survey on 




MCO = ƒ (Pay-L, Comp, SocR, EnvR, 
SocR-F) 
 
MCO: Motivation crowding-out 
measured as conservation 
behaviour in the experiment. 
Pay-L: Payment level. 
Comp: Competence. 
SocR: Social relatedness as 
presence of relatives in the 
experiment. 
EnvR: Environmental relatedness 
as real-life forest use. 
SocR-F: Social relatedness, fairness 
of the scheme for poor 
participants. 
No effects on aggregate. Increasing payments has a 
negative but diminishing 









Land use cards 
MCO = ƒ (Pay-L, Pay-T, Aut, Comp, 
SocR, Pen) 
 
MCO:  Motivation crowding-out 
measured as changes in intrinsic 
motivations. 
MCO under individual 
crop-price premium.  
 
MCI when payments are 
collective. 
 
Individual payments decrease 
guilt and regret feelings and 
foster MCO. Collective 
payments foster MCI through 












Pay-T: Type of payment (Collective 
or individual payment) vs crop-
price premium. 
Aut: Autonomy as self-
endorsement of forest protection. 
Comp: Competence as self-
approval. 
SocR: Social relatedness as part of 
fair and equitable collective action. 


















structured interview at 




MCO = ƒ (Pay-T, Comp, SocR, 
Contx) 
 
MCO:  Motivation crowding-out 
measured as participation in 
maintenance of collective 
infrastructure. 
Pay-T: Type of payment (None, 
collective in-kind, verbal reward)  
Comp: Competence. 
SocR: Social relatedness in terms of 
reciprocity. 
Contx: Context (terms of trust in 
local leaders). 
MCO when reward is 
expressed as a possibility 
at individual level. 
 
MCI when in-kind 
payments are collective 
and are given under a 
strong feeling of 
reciprocity and a context 
of trusted local 
leadership.  
MCI also happens when 
individual verbal rewards 
foster recognition by local 
leaders. 















MCO = ƒ (Pay-T, EnvR, Contx) 
 
MCO: Motivation crowding-out 
measured as change in stated 
perceptions of forest values. 
Pay-T: Payment type in terms of 
contractual design. 
EnvR: Environmental relatedness 
expressed as hoy they perceive the 
forest. 
Strong statistically 
significant MCO and 
undermining effect. 
Sharp contrast between 
forest-peoples’ traditional 
cultural values and the 
incoming PES socio-




Contx: Institutional and market 
integration dynamics 
(deforestation threats). 











Motivations: Reasons to 
enrol in the certification 
scheme and preference 
of cash vs in-kind 
benefits. 
MCO = ƒ (Pay-T, Aut, Comp) 
 
MCO: Motivation crowding-out 
measured as the shift in the type of 
motivations that explain 
participation. 
Pay-T: Payment type in terms of 
short-term vs long term. 
Aut: Autonomy in terms of more 
power to negotiate at state level. 
Comp: Competence in terms of 
increased knowledge and capacity 
building. 
MCO and MCI coexist as 
suggested by participants’ 
statements. 
Certification activates both 
intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations. Hybrid 
motivations combining 
economic and non-economic 
motivations –such as 





















No effects. PES coalesces into a rural 
collective territorial pathway 
characterised by a will to 
increase agrarian activities. 
FFE: Framed Field Experiment; MCOUE: Motivation crowding-out, undermining effect; Pay-T: Payment type; Pen: Penalty; MCI: Motivation crowding-in; Pay-









Table 3. Expected impact of PES design and implementation on individuals’ internal satisfaction and motivations under SDT.  
 
Moderator Sub-moderator Design predicting motivation crowding-in Design predicting no effects or motivation crowding-
out 







Bottom-up participative approach: 
Making all stakeholders participate in the 
design to choose the type of reward 
(Grolleau and McCann, 2012; 
Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2016). 
Non-participatory top-down approach (Chervier et 
al. this issue). 










Payments are seen by beneficiaries as a 
recognition of their effort and know-how 
(Bose et al.; van Hecken et al. this issue). 
 
Verbal communication stating success 
over achieving expected or higher results 
(Kolinjivadi et al. this issue; 
Dedeurwaerdere et al., 2016). 
 
Strengthening actor competences 










Boring and not aligned with personal development 
(Hendrickson and Corbera, 2015; De Martino et al., 
2016). 











Adjustment of payments to performance 




Favouring the most social and 
environmental vulnerable populations 
(Pascual et al., 2014). 
 
Sanctioning free riders to create a sense 
of justice. (Claassen et al., 2008). 
Payments not recognizing heterogeneity of 
opportunity costs and benefiting altogether 
beneficiaries with and without opportunity costs 
(Rico Garcia-Amado et al., 2011). 
 
Payments benefiting the richer and the most 
powerful (Chervier et al. this issue). 
 
 
PES participants feel frustration if free riders are not 









Group and community 
inclusion  
 
Aligning with trust in the collective and 
institutions (Andersson et al., 2018; 
Bottazzi et al., 2018; Bose et al.; van 
Hecken et al. this issue). 
 
Collective activities: collective 
investments and monitoring, payments 
through collective work, exchange of 
students, conflict resolution through 
consensus, collective festivities (Agarwal 
et al., 2007; Sommerville et al., 2010; 
Solarte, 2013; Agrawal et al. 2015; Moros 








Imposing collective benefits if strong social conflicts 
exist within the community (Costedoat et al, 2016). 
 
Individual payments conservation tasks  
(Clements et al., 2010). 
Environmental 
relatedness 
Feeling of belonging 
 
 
Well-being, awareness of 
healthy environment 
Conservation and transmission of 
traditional ecological knowledge. 
 
Environmental education meetings. 
Open-air activities. 
Commodification (Kosoy and Corbera, 2010). 
 
